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This paper reexamines data from the New York City school choice program, the largest 
and best implemented private school scholarship experiment yet conducted.  In the 
experiment, low-income public school students in grades K-4 were eligible to participate 
in a series of lotteries for a private school scholarship in May 1997.  Data were collected 
from students and their parents at baseline, and in the Spring of each of the next three 
years.  Students with missing baseline test scores, which encompasses all those who were 
initially in Kindergarten and 11 percent of those initially in grades 1-4, were excluded 
from previous analyses of achievement, even though these students were tested in the 
follow-up years.  In principle, random assignment would be expected to lead treatment 
status to be uncorrelated with all baseline characteristics.  Including students with 
missing baseline test scores increases the sample size by 44 percent.  For African 
American students, the only group to show a significant, positive effect of vouchers on 
achievement in past studies, the difference in average follow-up test scores between the 
treatment group (those offered a voucher) and control group (those not offered a voucher) 
becomes statistically insignificant at the .05 level and much smaller if the full sample is 
used.  In addition, the effect of vouchers is found to be sensitive to the particular way 
race/ethnicity was defined.  Previously, race was assigned according to the racial/ethnic 
category of the child's mother, and parents who marked “other” and wrote in 
Black/Hispanic were typically coded as non-Black and non-Hispanic.  If children with a 
Black father are added to the sample of children with a Black mother, the effect of 
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  1
  Now that the Supreme Court has ruled in the Zelman case that public funds may 
be used to support vouchers to enroll children in private religious schools, many states, 
school districts and parents will seriously consider the desirability of school vouchers.  
This decision naturally depends on many factors, not least of which is whether vouchers 
are likely to raise student achievement.  The best currently available evidence on the 
effect of school vouchers on students￿ performance is from a series of three randomized 
experiments conducted in Washington, D.C., Dayton, OH and New York City by Paul 
Peterson and his collaborators.  This paper reexamines evidence from the New York City 
voucher experiment, which was conducted by Mathematica Policy Research (MPR) and 
the Program on Education Policy and Governance at Harvard University.   
The New York City experiment was selected because it is the only one of the 
three experiments for which data have been made available to outside researchers so far.  
Two additional reasons argue for a detailed evaluation of the New York experiment, 
however.  First, the New York experiment is the best documented of the three 
experiments, and had the lowest attrition rate, highest voucher take-up rate, and largest 
sample size.  Second, New York is the only one of the three cities to show significant 
gains in test scores for voucher recipients relative to non-recipients for African American 
students at the conclusion of the experiment.
1  In all three experiments, there is no 
significant difference in student performance between those offered a voucher and the 
control group for other racial and ethnic groups, or overall.   
                                                 
1 See Howell and Peterson (2002), Table 6-3.  In Washington, vouchers had a statistically insignificant, 
negative effect on Black students￿ scores after three years; in Dayton, vouchers had a positive effect that 
was statistically insignificant at the 0.10 level holding constant family background controls (but significant 
at the 0.10 level without family background controls) in the second and final year of the experiment.  2
The New York City school choice experiment worked as follows.
2  In February 
1997, the School Choice Scholarships Foundation (SCSF), a private foundation, offered 
1,300 scholarships worth up to $1,400 a year for three years to children from low-income 
families (i.e., qualified for free lunch) who were enrolled in Kindergarten through fourth 
grade in New York City public schools.  Some 11,105 eligible students applied for a 
scholarship between February and late April 1997.  Recipients were selected in a series of 
lotteries in May 1997, and began attending private schools the next fall.  Mathematica 
randomly selected the students offered vouchers (subject to the SCSF requirement that 85 
percent of recipients be from public schools in the bottom half of the city-wide test score 
distribution) and a control group from the eligible applicants. About three quarters of the 
students who were offered vouchers used them in at least one year; these students 
overwhelmingly attended religious schools.
3  Information from the students and their 
parents was collected prior to the lottery and in the spring of each of the ensuing three 
years.  Base weights were constructed so the students in the sample were representative 
of the pool of eligible applicants (which had 70 percent from schools with below-median 
scores), and the weights were subsequently adjusted for nonresponse each year.   
Students were given the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) at baseline and in the 
spring of each of the three follow-up years.  A decision was made not to test the cohort of 
Kindergarten students applying for scholarships for first grade at baseline, however.  
(Henceforth, the five cohorts of students in different grades will be referred to by their 
grade level at baseline.)  The Kindergarten cohort was nonetheless given follow-up ITBS 
tests, along with other students, when they were in grades 1, 2 and 3.  In addition, about 
                                                 
2 See Mayer, Peterson and Myers, et al. (2002) and Hill, Rubin and Thomas (2000) for further details.   
3 Only 11 percent of the controls attended private school in at least one year.    3
11 percent of students initially in grades 1-4 lacked baseline scores.
4  These students were 
also given the ITBS in the three follow-up waves.  The sample weights do not attempt to 
adjust for missing baseline scores.   
A contribution of our paper is that we include students with missing baseline 
scores in much of our analysis.  Previous analyses of achievement omitted students with 
missing baseline test data.
5  Howell and Peterson (2002), for example, report, ￿A handful 
of additional families were offered vouchers, but they were not included in the evaluation 
for lack of baseline [test] information.￿  Because of random assignment, however, 
estimates are unbiased even without conditioning on baseline information, so there is an 
efficiency loss from excluding these students.  For the subsample with baseline scores, 
omitting the baseline score only trivially affects the estimated treatment effect, as one 
would expect with random assignment.  Including students with missing baseline test 
data increases the sample size by 44 percent in the third and final follow-up year; nearly 
30% of those with missing baseline scores were in grades 1-4 when the experiment 
started and should have had baseline scores.  An argument can be made that including 
students with missing baseline scores ￿ both those in the Kindergarten cohort and those in 
the other cohorts ￿ is desirable because the weights make no provision for sample 
exclusion due to missing baseline scores, and, more importantly, because using a sample 
that encompasses more grade levels enhances the generalizability of the results.   
                                                 
4  This is in addition to students who had scores of 0 on the baseline test ￿ of the 1,851 students with 
baseline scores, 199 (10.7%) received a zero score in reading and 324 (17.5%) received a zero score in 
math; 97 (5.2%) received a zero on both exams. 
5 When Mayer, Peterson and Myers, et al. (2002) examine outcomes such as parental satisfaction, however, 
they include observations on students without baseline test data.  It is unclear whether Howell and Peterson 
(2002) include or exclude students with missing baseline tests when they study parental responses.  Their 
Table 2-3 reports that they include students entering grades 1-4, but that apparently is a misprint, as their 
sample includes students entering grades 2-5.  Nevertheless, we could only replicate some of their results 
based on the parental survey if we include the Kindergarten cohort.  4
For African American students, the estimated effect of being offered a voucher is 
much weaker if students with missing baseline scores are included in the analysis.  In the 
third follow-up year, for example, the effect of being offered a voucher on composite test 
scores is 2.78 percentile points (t = 1.64) if baseline test scores are dropped from the 
model and the larger sample is used; controlling for baseline covariates other than test 
scores, the effect is 2.08 points with a t-ratio of 1.24.
6  For comparison, Mayer, Peterson 
and Myers report an effect of 5.50 points with a t-ratio of 3.42.  Results are also weaker 
in the first two follow-up years if students with missing baseline scores are included.  
These findings raise doubts about the robustness of earlier findings of a significant 
positive effect of offering vouchers on the test scores of African American students.    
In the next section, we discuss and evaluate the random assignment procedures in 
more detail.  In the following section we explore the sensitivity of the results to including 
and excluding students with missing baseline scores, and examine differences in the 
treatment effect across cohorts.   
Although results for the larger sample encompassing students with and without 
baseline scores cast doubt on the inference that vouchers had a positive impact on Black 
students￿ test scores, we explore reasons why vouchers might have been more effective at 
raising scores for Black students than for other students in the grade 1-4 cohorts.  Results 
presented in Section 4 suggest that differential characteristics of the initial public schools 
Black and non-Black students attended are not responsible for any differential effect by 
race, even in the sample analyzed by Howell and Peterson.   
                                                 
6 These estimates also control for 30 dummies indicating the original strata students were placed in for 
random assignment and utilize bootstrap standard errors.   We weighted the underlying data using the 
revised follow-up weights that Mathematica provided on April 3, 2003.     5
The data suggest that race itself independently affects the gain from vouchers in 
the Howell-Peterson sample.  This leads us to examine the particular definition of race 
that was used.  There is no universally accepted definition of race.  Mathematica assigned 
students to a racial/ethnic group based on a single question on the parental survey that 
asked respondents to select only one of the following categories for the mother or female 
guardian: Black/African American (non-Hispanic), White (non-Hispanic), Puerto Rican, 
Dominican, Other, etc.  Students were assigned the mother￿s race/ethnicity, regardless of 
the father￿s race or ethnicity.  Thus, if a student is reported as having a Black mother and 
a Hispanic father, he or she was classified as Black.  If the same student had a Black 
father and Hispanic mother, however, he or she would have been classified as Hispanic.  
Arguably, father￿s race is also relevant.  If we augment the sample to include students for 
whom either parent is classified as Black/African American and those whose parents 
marked ￿Other￿ and wrote in Black/Hispanic in the blank provided, the effect of offering 
a voucher on the composite score in year three falls to 1.44 points with a t-ratio of 1.01.  
So in the broader sample the effect of offering vouchers to students with a Black parent is 
small and statistically insignificant.   
Throughout the paper, we focus mainly on intent-to-treat estimates; that is, the 
impact of offering students a voucher on their test performance, as opposed to the effect 
of attending private school on test performance.  We focus on intent-to-treat estimates 
because offering a voucher ￿ as opposed to compelling students to switch to private 
school -- is the policy decision that is most relevant, and because there is a cleaner 
statistical interpretation of the intent-to-treat estimates in this case.  Nevertheless, the 
effect of attending a private school for varying lengths of time is also of interest.  In  6
Section 5 we present Instrumental Variables results that estimate the impact of the 
number of years in private school on student achievement.  These results differ from 
those emphasized by Howell and Peterson (2002), who examine the effect of attending 
private school for three full years, and implicitly make strong assumptions about the 
effect of switching to private school on achievement for those who attend private school 
for fewer than three years.   
 
1.  Randomization and Data 
The procedures used to randomly assign students to treatment and control status, 
and select control group members for follow up, are described in Hill, Rubin and Thomas 
(2000).  Because multiple children from many families applied for scholarships, and it 
was desired to assign all family members to the same treatment status, students were 
assigned to control and treatment groups in a lottery in which families were the unit of 
observation.  Two methods of random assignment were used.   
Briefly, for students from 1,000 families a Propensity Match Pairs Design 
(PMPD) was used, and for students from 960 families a Stratified Block design was used.  
The PMPD method, which introduces considerable complexity to the design, was used 
because in the first lottery many more potential control group members were available to 
be followed up than was money to follow them up.  Rather than select a random sample 
of the controls to follow up, it was decided that it would be more efficient to follow up 
the subset that, in some sense, is most alike to treatment group members.  Consequently, 
after the treatment group was randomly selected, the members of the control group who 
were followed up were selected by estimating a propensity score model to identify those 
with attributes that were closest to members of the treatment group.    7
According to Hill, Rubin and Thomas (2000), variables used in this model 
included, in order of importance: family size, a dummy indicating above versus below 
median schools, grade level, and initial test scores.
7  Students with missing data were also 
included in the selection.  Once the propensity score model was estimated, a matched pair 
for each treatment group family was selected by choosing the nearest available neighbor 
Mahalanobis match from among those with propensity scores close to that of each 
treatment group member.  
The Stratified Block design was much simpler.  Samples of screened applicants 
were invited to participate in four sessions at which baseline data were collected and 
ITBS tests were administered.  In these lotteries, by design approximately 85 percent of 
the invitees were from schools with below the city median test score.  Treatments and 
controls were randomly assigned in four lotteries, and a random sample of participants 
were included in the follow-up sample.  Each of these lotteries constitutes a block.   
One can define 30 mutually exclusive ￿random assignment strata￿: 5 lottery 
blocks (PMPD block plus 4 stratified blocks) x 2 school types (above and below city 
median test) x 3 family size groups (1, 2 or 3 or more students).  Assignment is random 
within these strata.  After the lotteries were held, Mathematica discovered that some 
families had misreported their family size and were thus placed in the ￿wrong￿ strata; 
revised strata were created with the latest family size information.  Nevertheless, 
assignment to treatment status is random within the original strata that were actually used 
to apportion the sample at the time of random assignment.  Howell and Peterson (2002) 
                                                 
7 Other variables included, in order of importance, were: ethnicity, mother￿s education, participation in 
special education, participation in a gifted and talented program, language spoken at home, welfare receipt, 
food stamp receipt, mother￿s employment status, educational expectations, number of siblings, and an 
indicator for whether the mother was foreign born.   8
and Mayer, Peterson and Myers, et al. (2002), however, controlled for dummies 
indicating membership in the revised strata, not the actual strata used to make 
assignments.  Unless otherwise specified, our results condition on the actual strata that 
were used when random assignments were made.  Fortunately, the choice of original or 
revised strata has relatively little impact on the results.   
Because assignments were over families, not students, and children from the same 
family tend to have correlated outcomes, we compute bootstrap standard errors that use 
families instead of individual students as the unit for resampling to allow for dependence 
across family members.
8  (Forty-six percent of students in the sample had at least one 
sibling in the sample as well.)  Moulton (1990) provides a nice illustration of inference 
problems that can arise from ignoring correlated errors.    
Table 1 reports the mean of several baseline characteristics for the treatment and 
control groups for the full sample, separately for Black and Latino students, and 
disaggregated by cohort for Black students.  Because random assignment was 
implemented within strata, regressions were estimated to condition on the 30 original 
randomization strata, and conditional treatment-control differences and t-tests are 
reported as well.  For the overall sample, the results indicate small and statistically 
insignificant differences between the treatment and control groups.  For example, the 
conditional t-test for the difference in the mean baseline composite test score between 
treatments and controls is only -0.65.  Mayer, Peterson and Myers, et al. (2002) present 
similar results.  Hill, Rubin and Thomas (2000) report treatment-control differences by 
PMPD versus Stratified Block strata, and find slightly better balance in the PMPD strata,  
                                                 
8 The sample was drawn with replacement 10,000 times to compute the bootstrap standard errors.    9
but in both cases there are not systematic differences between the treatments and controls. 
In the first-year follow-up report, however, Peterson, Myers and Howell (1998) 
reported highly statistically significant differences in baseline test scores between the 
treatment and control group, with control group members scoring significantly higher on 
both the math and reading exams.  Evidently, this was a result of inaccurate weights.  The 
baseline weights did not adjust correctly for the size of the underlying assignment strata.
9  
In the subsequent reports, the baseline weights were revised ￿to include post-stratification 
adjustments,￿ and the baseline differences in test scores were no longer statistically 
significant.  The complexity of the design of the experiment undoubtedly contributed to 
the initially inaccurate baseline weights, as the average discrepancy between the initial 
and corrected baseline weights was 316 percent for the PMPD strata and only 24 percent 
for the Stratified Block strata.
10  
Because of a small inconsistency in the baseline weights that we pointed out to 
MPR, another mistake was discovered in the baseline weights.  Mathematica 
subsequently provided us with revised baseline and follow-up weights.  The follow-up 
weights adjust the baseline weights for nonresponse, by using estimates from a logit 
equation to predict nonresponse from observed characteristics; a stepwise procedure was 
used to help select covariates in the logit model.  Unless otherwise noted, we utilize the 
revised weights that Mathematica recommended on April 3, 2003 throughout this paper.   
The results in Table 1 suggest that the assignment groups were well balanced, as 
one would expect with random assignment.  One exception, however, is the oldest cohort 
of African American students.  For this group, at baseline the treatments￿ mean score is 
                                                 
9 Email communication from David Myers of Mathematica, February 5, 2001.   
10 In particular, the weight accorded to the control PMPD strata increased considerably.   10
higher than the controls￿, and the treatments are more likely to come from higher income 
families with better educated mothers.  For African Americans as a whole, however, the 
differences in baseline characteristics are typically insignificant.    
The Addendum to the table reports follow-up information: the mean test score in 
year three and the proportion of students who ever attended a private school (during the 
three follow-up years of the experiment).  Eighty-one percent of Black students offered a 
voucher used it in at least one year, compared with 10 percent of those not offered a 
voucher, leading to a 71 percentage point increase in the likelihood that those offered a 
voucher enrolled in private school.  The increase in private school enrollment was smaller 
for the Kindergarten and third grade cohorts, but still in excess of 60 percentage points.  
Test scores are considered extensively below.   
1.1 Precision 
The PMPD design was intended to reduce sampling variance and improve the 
balance between treatments and controls.  Did the precision of the estimates improve?  
Table 2 reports separate estimates of the treatment effect and associated standard errors 
for the two methods of random assignment.  The treatment effect in this instance is the 
average impact of being offered a voucher on students￿ test scores, measured in National 
Percentile Ranks (NPR￿s).  Formally, the treatment effect, α, is computed by estimating 
the following regression model for each follow-up year:  
(1)   Yif = α Zf  +  δ
j
if + εif,  
where  Yif  is the composite test score (that is, average NPR on reading and math),  Zf is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the student was offered a voucher and zero if not, δ
j
if is 
a fixed effect for the randomization strata (j = 1, ￿, 30), and εif is an error term that is  11
possibly correlated among members of the same family.  The subscript i indexes students 
and f indexes families.  The strata fixed effects are controlled for by including 30 dummy 
variables indicating each original randomization stratum.   
We also present another set of estimates in which the regression model is 
augmented to control for baseline math and reading test scores, using as a sample the 
subset of students who have baseline test scores.  Formally:   
(2)        Yif = ∀  Zf  + γMM if  + γRR if + δ
j
if + ε￿if,  
where M is the math NPR score, R is the reading NPR score, and the γ￿s are coefficients.  
Both equations (1) and (2) provide unbiased estimates of the effect of offering a voucher; 
hence, they are specified with the same parameter, α.
11  
Estimates of α for the full sample are in Panel A, and for African Americans in 
Panel B.  The rows of the table indicate whether the underlying regression model 
controlled for baseline test scores or omitted baseline scores and used a larger sample.  
The second to last column reports the standard error in the Stratified Block design 
relative to the standard error in the PMPD design.  Because the sample sizes differ 
slightly, in the last column the relative standard errors are scaled by the ratio of the 
square root of the relative sample sizes.
12   
For the full sample, in most cases the standard error of the estimated treatment 
effect is about 10 percent larger in the Stratified Block design than in the PMPD design. 
The adjustment for sample size has little effect on this ratio.  The treatment effect is 
                                                 
11 See R.A. Fisher (1951) for a thoughtful discussion of whether baseline covariates (e.g., crop yields) 
should be held constant in agricultural experiments.  Recognizing that estimates with or without baseline 
covariates are unbiased, he concludes that in practice the gain in precision from adding covariates is not 
worth the extra cost of collecting the data.  Coincidentally, the magnitudes are similar to the voucher 
experiment.  12
insignificantly different from zero under either design.  Thus, there is a small gain in 
power from the PMPD design.   
For the subsample of Black students the standard errors are not consistently 
smaller in the PMPD design than in the Stratified Block design.  This result is somewhat 
surprising because, as Hill, Rubin and Thomas point out, analyses of subgroups are 
expected to have more power in the PMPD design because matching should lead to a 
more equal representation of subgroups in the treatment and control groups.   
One could question whether the gain in precision from the PMPD random 
assignment procedure was worth the cost of added complexity. For practical purposes, 
the difference in precision between the two designs is fairly small, even in the full 
sample: in year 3, for example, the width of a 95% confidence interval increases trivially,  
from +/-3.1 points in the PMPD design to +/-3.5 points in the Stratified Block design.  If 
the complexity of the experimental design contributed to the incorrect initial inference 
about the baseline difference in test scores (because of inaccurate weights), then in this 
case the PMPD design would seem to have been hardly worth the gain in power.  This 
likelihood seems to us to underscore Cochran and Cox￿s (1957) advice: ￿A good working 
rule is to use the simplest experimental design that meets the needs of the occasion.￿   
 
2.  Sensitivity of Earlier Results  
  Next we explore the sensitivity of the estimated impact of offering a voucher to 
controlling or not controlling for baseline scores, and to including the cohort of students 
who were in Kindergarten when the experiment began.  The first set of columns in Tables 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 At baseline, the sample size was 1,341 for the PMPD sample and 1,325 for the Stratified Block sample. 
The sample sizes in Table 2 differ because of missing follow-up test data.  If attrition is endogenous to the 
design, then the unadjusted comparison is more appropriate.   13
3a and 3b provide estimates of equation (2): a regression of the test score NPR on a 
dummy indicating whether the student was randomly selected to be offered a voucher, 
baseline test scores, and 30 dummy variables indicating the actual stratum the family was 
allocated to for random assignment.  The coefficient (α) on the voucher offer dummy, 
also known as the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate, is presented in the table, along with its 
standard error and t-ratio. 
  In Table 3a we use the same sample, follow-up weights and strata definition as 
Mayer, Peterson and Myers, et al., Tables 23-25.  Our results exactly replicate theirs.  As 
they found, for Black students the results indicate significantly higher test scores for 
those offered a voucher than for the controls.  For Latino students the voucher effect is 
negative but statistically insignificant.   
  The first estimates in Table 3b correct two minor flaws.  First, as mentioned, the 
previous researchers did not control for the actual strata that students were placed in 
when random assignments were made; instead, they controlled for strata based in part on 
revised family size information.  To exploit the experiment, it is more appropriate to 
control for the strata that were actually used at the time of random assignment, so we use 
the original strata in Table 3b and elsewhere in the paper (except Table 3a).  Second, we 
weight the data using revised follow-up weights that Mathematica provided after the 
earlier work was completed.  The revised weights correct for a minor problem in the 
baseline weights.  These two changes result in a slightly larger estimate of the ITT effect 
for Black students in the first and second follow-up years, and a slightly smaller one in  14
the third follow-up year.  Henceforth, we focus on estimates using the more appropriate 
weights and strata controls.
13   
  The middle set of columns in Tables 3a and 3b report estimates for models that 
use the same sample of students ￿ i.e., those who were in grades 1-4 and have baseline 
test data ￿ but omit the baseline test scores (i.e., equation (1)).  Omitting the baseline 
scores has a trivial effect on the ITT estimate, as one would expect given random 
assignment.  For the year-three composite score for African Americans in Table 3b, for 
example, the estimated treatment effect is 5.03 points controlling for baseline scores and 
5.00 points without controlling for baseline scores.  Such stability is expected in a 
randomized experiment with a reasonably large sample.   
  The third set of columns report estimates of the same model for the largest 
possible sample, including students initially in Kindergarten (none of whom were tested 
at baseline) and those initially in grades 1-4 with missing baseline scores.
14  Seventy-one 
percent of the additional observations are from the Kindergarten cohort, and 29 percent 
from the other cohorts.  The results for African American students are notably weaker in 
the larger sample.  In year three, for example, the estimated treatment effect in Table 3b  
falls about in half, to 2.78 points (s.e. = 1.69), with a t-ratio that is about equal to the 
threshold value for statistical significance at the 0.10 level.
15  By subject, the effect on the 
                                                 
13 Myers and Mayer (2003) acknowledge that the original strata controls we use in Table 3b are preferable 
to the ones used in their previous estimates.   
14 Note that the cohort in Kindergarten at baseline was in grade 1, 2 or 3 during the follow ups, so testing 
them in the follow-up waves presumably did not pose greater challenges than testing the other cohorts 
when they were in those grades. 
15 The conventional OLS standard error in this case is 1.64, not very different than the one we compute, 
which allows for within family correlated errors.  The standard errors we have computed are likely an 
underestimate because we have not taken into account added uncertainty that arises from the estimation of 
the follow-up weights or from dependence among paired observations in the PMPD strata.    15
reading test is even smaller, while the treatment effect for the mathematics test is larger 
and statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  A similar pattern is found in Table 3a.   
  The notably smaller estimate when students with missing baseline scores are 
included in the sample is due to both the inclusion of students who were in Kindergarten 
and those who were in grades 1-4 at baseline.  If the Kindergarten cohort is excluded 
from the sample in the model in Table 3b that omits baseline scores, the treatment effect 
in the composite score regression for African Americans is 4.37 (s.e. = 1.85; N = 577).  
So about 30 percent of the reduction in the impact effect from including students with 
missing baseline scores comes about from adding students in grades 1-4, and about 70 
percent from including Kindergarten students.   
  Interestingly, the standard errors are only trivially different between the estimates 
that condition on baseline test scores and those that do not but use a larger sample.  In the 
third follow up, for example, the standard error for the treatment effect on African 
American students￿ reading scores is 0.09 points smaller using the full sample and 
omitting baseline scores than it is in the subsample that controls for baseline scores, and 
for math scores it is the same whether baseline scores are omitted or included.  For the 
composite scores, the standard error is .02 points larger when baseline scores are omitted. 
The reason for this similarity is that the reduction in residual variance from controlling 
for baseline scores is roughly offset by the gain in precision from having a larger sample.  
One can improve the precision of the estimates in Table 3b by controlling for 
baseline information other than test scores.  Table 4 presents results from models that 
control for the original 30 randomization strata, cohort (i.e., grade at baseline), gender, 
log family income, mother￿s years of schooling, indicators for whether the mother works  16
full- or part-time, an indicator for whether the student has had special education, an 
indicator for whether the student has been in a gifted or talented class, student￿s age, and 
dummies for English spoken at home, mother born in the United States, family welfare 
receipt, mother resided in residence for more than one year, and whether the mother￿s 
religion was Catholic.
16  The first set of columns present results from models that also 
control for baseline test scores, for the subsample of observations with baseline scores.   
Results shown in the second set of columns are based on the larger sample and 
omit baseline test scores from the model.  The treatment effect of vouchers is smaller in 
these models.  In year 3, for example, the impact of offering a voucher on the composite 
score for African Americans is 2.08 NPR￿s  (t-ratio = 1.24).  Again, the impact on math 
scores is larger than the impact on reading scores.   
Finally, it is possible to incorporate the information on baseline scores for those 
who have it, and still use the larger sample.  In particular, we created a dummy variable 
that equals one if baseline scores are available and zero if they are missing.
17  Define this 
variable as D.  We then interacted D with the baseline math and reading scores, which 
imposes a value of zero for those with missing scores regardless of the values one would 
have used to impute those scores.  The following ￿hybrid￿ model was estimated using the 
full sample of observations, both those with and without baseline scores: 
(3)  Yif  = α Zf  + γM Mif!Dif  +  γRR if!Dif  + λDif + Xif￿β + ν
c
if  + δ
j
if + εif, 
where X is a vector of other baseline covariates, such as gender, mother￿s education and 
log family income, and ν
c is a set of cohort fixed effects.  This model has the effect of 
                                                 
16 So as to not reduce the sample size, missing values of income and mother￿s education were replaced by 
their means, and dummy variables were included indicating whether income, mother￿s education, students￿ 
gender, mother￿s employment status, and each of the other covariates were missing.   
17 It is never the case that math scores are missing and reading scores are available, or vice versa.  17
controlling for baseline scores for students who have them, and not controlling for 
baseline scores for student who lack them. Because baseline scores can be missing for 
two distinct reasons ￿ either students are in the Kindergarten cohort and not tested by 
design or they are in the other cohorts and failed to comply with testing ￿ controlling for 
cohort dummies and D in the hybrid model removes differences between these groups.   
Results of estimating ∀  from equation (3) without X-covariates (but with cohort 
and lottery strata dummies) are reported in the third set of columns in Table 4, and with 
additional X-covariates in the fourth set of columns of the table.  Notice that the standard 
errors from both hybrid models are smaller than those from the other models in the table.  
The hybrid model with the additional X-covariates in the right-most set of columns, it 
turns out, typically yields the most powerful estimates of the models we have considered.  
Controlling for baseline test scores when they are available results in a slightly higher 
estimated effect of vouchers when the X-covariates are excluded.  In the model without 
the X-covariates, the year-three impact of offering a voucher on the composite test scores 
of African American students is just below the threshold for statistical significance at the 
0.05 level.  In the model with additional baseline covariates ￿ which yields a slightly 
more precise estimate -- the effect is somewhat smaller, 2.13 NPR￿s, and not statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level.  This point estimate is less than half as large as the estimate 
in Mayer, Peterson and Myers, et al. (2002) and more precisely estimated.   
 
2.1 To Control, or Not Control 
 
Mayer, Peterson and Myers, et al. (2002, p. 9) give the following justification for 
why they controlled for baseline test scores: ￿Baseline characteristics were included to 
adjust for chance differences between the characteristics of treatment- and control-group  18
members and to increase the precision of the estimated impacts.￿  But because both sets 
of estimates ￿ those with or those without baseline characteristics ￿ provide an unbiased 
estimate of the treatment effect, only the latter rationale is potentially germane.
18  Any 
improvement in the estimates from controlling for covariates is fully reflected in the 
sampling variance of the estimates.  With or without covariates, the estimates are 
unbiased and approximately normally distributed, so the coefficient and standard error 
completely characterize the sampling distribution of the estimated treatment effect.   
The key question then is whether including baseline covariates reduces the 
residual variance by enough to justify the loss of degrees of freedom and the fact that, in 
practice, some observations must be dropped from the sample because they have missing 
baseline data.  On this basis, there is little reason to chose between the estimates in Table 
3b that control for baseline test scores and the ones that do not.  Both are unbiased with 
about equal power.  However, an advantage of estimates using the larger sample is that 
the results potentially can be generalized to a broader population ￿ namely, students 
initially in grades K-4, as opposed to those in grades 1-4 without missing baseline data.  
Moreover, estimates without baseline covariates are simple and transparent.  And 
unless the specific covariates that are to be controlled are fully described in advance of 
analyzing the data in a project proposal or planning document, there is always the 
possibility of specification searching.  To avoid the charge of specification searching, we 
have provided results without covariates (except for those that define the randomization 
                                                 
18 Another way to see that the first rationale is inappropriate is to note that if there is a chance difference in 
a baseline characteristic between treatments and controls, there could also be an erroneous correlation (due 
to chance or misspecification) between the baseline characteristic and the outcome variable that would 
sway the estimated treatment effect if covariates are included.   A correlation between treatment status and 
baseline covariates in an experiment is potentially problematic regardless of whether baseline covariates are 
controlled in a regression.  Mayer, Peterson and Myers, et al. seem to imply that an unbiased estimator can 
be made less biased by controlling for covariates.    19
process), as well as others with a varying set of baseline covariates, so the reader can 
judge the sensitivity of the results for him or herself.   
Lastly, notice that equation (4) in the far right of Table 4, which incorporates the 
baseline covariates for those who have them and still uses observations for those with 
missing baseline data, provides the most precise estimates and pertains to those initially 
in grades K-4.  An argument can be made that, of the estimates presented so far, the most 
credence should be placed in these because they are the most precise.  As we explain in 
Section 4 below, however, we think the sample of Black students used in Table 4 is 
unnecessarily restrictive.  We also think it is wise to draw conclusions from the whole 
panoply of results, rather than one particular specification.   
 
2.2 Cohort Interactions 
 
The results in Tables 3a, 3b and 4 suggest that including students who were 
enrolled in Kindergarten at baseline in the sample qualitatively weakens the impact of 
school vouchers on achievement scores of African American students.  These students 
were in grades 1-3 when the follow-up tests were administered (assuming they were not 
held back), and were among the youngest students in the experiment.  One possibility is 
that vouchers are effective for older African American students, but not younger ones.  
Mathematica (2000) raised this concern after the second-year follow-up study.  Howell 
and Peterson (2002; p. 222) strongly argue against this interpretation, however, 
maintaining that ￿no decipherable pattern suggests that impacts vary by grade level.￿  
Our analysis of inter-cohort differences in treatment effects also suggests that the grade at 
which students are offered vouchers is unrelated to the magnitude of the treatment effect 
in the third year of the experiment when we test the null hypothesis of any unrestricted  20
pattern of cohort effects, although we find some tendency for older students to have a 
larger treatment effect when Kindergarten students are included in the sample and the 
cohort-treatment-status interaction is constrained to be linear.   
The treatment effect on the third-year composite test score for each cohort can be 
viewed in the Addendum at the bottom of Table 1.  The treatment effects are not uniform, 
and it is particularly large for the 4
th grade cohort, but they individually have large 
standard errors.  To conduct a formal test for inter-cohort variability in treatment effects, 
we interacted five dummy variables indicating membership in one of the initial grade 
cohorts with the treatment status dummy in the models in Table 4, and conducted an  
F-test of the null hypothesis that the treatment effects were equal for all cohorts.  In the 
third follow-up year, there was no more than a chance occurrence that the treatment 
effect differed across the cohorts for African American students.  For example, in the 
model for the composite score in the far right of Table 4, the p-value for an F-test of 
uniform treatment effects is 0.33.  This F-test puts no structure on the pattern of 
interactions and does not depend on first screening the pattern of coefficients to test a 
particular hypothesis, so in this sense it is ￿hands above the table.￿   
Observing the pattern of treatment effects by cohort, however, it appears that 
there may be a tendency for the older cohorts to have larger coefficients than younger 
cohorts.  If we perform a simple test for differential cohort effects that recognizes the 
order of the cohorts by including an interaction between a student￿s linear grade level at 
baseline (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) and the voucher offer dummy, as well as the voucher offer main 
effect, the p-value for a test of the interaction term in the most powerful model in Table 4 
is 0.06 for the composite score.  Thus, there is some evidence that the treatment effect  21
rises with the entry grade of the cohort of African American students in the full sample, 
but it is not overwhelming and it requires the imposition of a linear cohort-treatment 
interaction.  Moreover, it is unclear why the treatment effect would vary with age for 
African American students but not Hispanic students.   
 
2.3 Attrition 
  One commonly voiced criticism of the voucher experiments is that attrition was 
high, especially for the control group (e.g., Neal, 2002).  The response rate in the third 
year of the New York experiment was 68.8 percent for treatment group members and 
64.6 percent for control group members in cohorts 1-4.  The rates were slightly higher for 
the Kindergarten cohort: 71.7 percent for treatments and 69.2 percent for controls.  
Although, in principle, the follow-up sample weights adjust for attrition based on 
observable characteristics, it is possible that those who exited the sample differ along 
unobserved dimensions, and the average achievement in year three for non-responding 
treatments and controls could be different than it was for respondents.  Nonrandom 
attrition that is correlated with treatment status would bias the weighted estimates.   
In results not reported here, we examined the impact of attrition in a couple of 
different ways.  First, we computed two-step normal selection correction estimates to 
adjust for those with missing follow-up test scores.  Second, we used the technique 
employed in Krueger (1999) of carrying forward the last available test score for those 
with missing data to impute values.  We also used these techniques to adjust for students 
with scores of zero. These adjustments typically led to only slightly smaller estimates of 
the effect of vouchers.  Thus we conclude that nonrandom attrition was probably not a 
major problem in the experiment.    22
 
3.  The Relevance of Race and Residence  
  Our interpretation of the results so far is that the impact of vouchers on 
achievement for Black students in New York City is smaller and less robust than has 
been previously acknowledged.  Nevertheless, we examine reasons why there may have 
been gains using the sample that displayed the largest impact, Black students in the grade 
1-4 cohorts with baseline test data.  
The inference that African American students benefited academically from 
scholarships to attend private school would be more credible if there were a compelling 
explanation for why African American students benefited while other, equally poor 
Hispanic and White students did not benefit.  Howell and Peterson (2002) offer the 
following ex post explanation: ￿African Americans, more than other groups, live in the 
poorest, least attractive, and most dangerous communities within metropolitan regions.  
￿  Precisely because African Americans suffer most under a system of public education 
based on residency, they stand to benefit the most from the new education opportunities 
that vouchers afford.￿   
  In short, they hypothesize that constrained residential choices for African 
American families ￿ but not Dominican or Puerto Rican families ￿ account for the poor 
performance of public schools attended by African American students.  As a result, 
African American students are disproportionately confined to public schools that under 
perform vis-￿-vis private schools.  This is a plausible and potentially quite important 
hypothesis, with many striking implications.
19  Indeed, if discrimination in the housing 
market were responsible for the alleged poorer performance of Black students in public  23
school, then enforcing anti-discrimination laws could possibly be more effective at 
raising achievement than school reform.   
  Howell and Peterson￿s hypothesis is testable.  In particular, if differential 
residential location and therefore differential school attendance explains the results, then 
the minority of non-Black students who attend the same public schools as Black students 
should benefit from being offered private school scholarships as much as Black students.  
We find no support for this hypothesis.   
  To test the hypothesis, we identified all the non-Black students in the sample who, 
at the time of baseline, attended a public school that was also attended by a Black student 
in the sample that year.  In the third follow-up, a total of 470 non-Black students and 333 
Black students in cohorts 1-4 came from overlapping baseline schools.  We then adjusted 
the sample weights for this subsample of non-Black students so that weighted counts 
would correspond to the (weighted) distribution of Black students in the overlapping 
schools.  Consequently, we can produce results for a sample of non-Black students in the 
experiment who attended the same distribution of schools as a subsample of Black 
students in the experiment.  If differential residence and school attendance patterns by 
race are responsible for the differential effect of school vouchers, we would expect the 
sample of non-Black students in this subsample to exhibit the same treatment effect of 
vouchers as the Black students.   
  This was not the case.  If anything, the results point in the opposite direction.  For 
third year math scores, for example, the treatment effect of vouchers for the sample of 
Blacks from overlapping schools is 5.11 (s.e. = 2.39) and for non-Black students is ￿3.00 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 One fact that is inconsistent with this hypothesis, however, is that, on average, the Hispanic students have 
lower baseline test scores and lower family incomes than the Black, non-Hispanic students in the sample.    24
(s.e. = 3.32).
20  Even when attention is limited to the set of overlapping schools that 
Black and non-Black students attended, the non-Black students do not appear to gain 
from being offered a voucher; indeed, they do worse, and the differential treatment effect 
is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  In addition, we find an insignificant effect if 
we interact the percent of students in the baseline school who are Black (derived from 
Common Core Data reported by schools) with the treatment status dummy for non-Black 
or for Black students.  These findings suggest that differential characteristics of the initial 
public school that students with different racial backgrounds attended do not account for 
any gain in test scores that Black students may have reaped from attending private 
school.
21   
This conclusion is a contrast to Krueger and Whitmore￿s (2002) findings on racial 
differences of the effect of class size.  They find that the Black students benefited more 
from attending smaller classes than White students, but when they estimate effects for 
White students who attended the same mix of schools as Black students, the White 
students benefited equally.  They concluded, ￿These findings suggest that small classes 
matter for Blacks because of something having to do with the schools they attend, rather 
than something inherent to individual Black students per se.￿ In the case of New York 
City school vouchers, if one accepts that there is an impact for Black students, something 
about race itself would seem to be part of the reason.   
 
                                                 
20 These results control for baseline test scores and 30 strata dummies.  Similar results arise if reading data 
are analyzed, or if data from all five cohorts are used and baseline scores are dropped from the model.  We 
focus here on the older cohorts to give the hypothesis a stronger chance of being supported by the data.   
 
21 From examining administrative data on school characteristics and parental reports on the school 
environments, Mayer, Myers and Tuttle (2002) similarly conclude, ￿Differences in school characteristics 
do not appear to explain the differences in test scores between the African American and Latino controls.￿  25
 
4.  Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Black Mothers and Fathers 
 
If race matters, it is important to know how race is defined.  Race is a social 
construct that varies from survey to survey.  In Howell and Peterson (2002), African 
American students are defined as children whose mother or female guardian is reported 
as Black/African American (non-Hispanic) in the parental survey.  Specifically, the 
Mathematica baseline survey asked respondents to ￿MARK ONLY ONE￿ of the 
following racial/ethnic categories for each parent or guardian: ￿Black/African American 
(non-Hispanic); White (non-Hispanic); Puerto Rican; Dominican; Other Hispanic￿; 
American Indian; Chinese; etc.  At the end of the list, respondents were given an 
opportunity to mark ￿Other￿ and write in a response.  Mathematica then coded a child￿s 
race as Black if the mother or female guardian marked ￿Black/African American (non-
Hispanic)￿.  Consequently, a child￿s race and Hispanic ethnic origin are by definition 
mutually exclusively in these data.  This deviates from the Office of Management and 
Budget￿s guidelines (Statistical Policy Directive No. 15), which recommend separate 
questions for race and ethnicity self-identification questions.
22   
We find from the 1990 Census that in the New York metropolitan area 15 percent 
of low-income (≤  $20,000) children age 5-14 whose race is reported as ￿Black, African 
American or Negro￿ are also reported as Hispanic.
23  And 28 percent of those who 
indicate their ethnicity as Dominican indicate their race as Black/African American.  A 
total of 541 students whose race/ethnicity was classified as Dominican participated in the  
                                                 
22 In other surveys, such as the National Job Corps Study, Mathematica has used the OMB format of asking 
separate race and ethnicity questions.  
23 This is based on a sample of children living in the New York-Northeastern New Jersey Consolidated 
Metropolitan Area.   26
voucher experiment, almost half as many as the number of non-Hispanic Blacks who 
participated.  Many of those who were categorized as Dominican probably would have 
identified themselves as Black if the Census question on race had been used in the study.  
Because the treatment effect of vouchers was negative for students whose race was 
classified as Dominican Republic, including Black Dominicans in the sample of Black 
students would likely lead to smaller estimated treatment effects.   
Another problem is that the practice of assigning a child the race/ethnicity of his 
or her mother irrespective of his or her father￿s race is asymmetric and restrictive.
24  
Some countries, such as China, legally assign a child￿s race based on the father￿s race, 
while others use the mother￿s race, and still others allow families to choose.  In part, race 
may matter because society treats individuals with different skin tones differently (see, 
e.g., Darity, Hamilton and Dietrich, 2001, Keith and Herring, 1991 and Scarr, et al., 
1977).  If this is the case, then one could argue that treating mothers and fathers 
symmetrically is more sensible than assigning race according to the mother￿s race, 
regardless of father￿s race.  Moreover, race was reported as Black for 85 percent of the 
children with a Black father and a Hispanic mother present in the New York metropolitan 
region, according to our tabulation of the 1990 Census.  Because most of the children 
with a Black father who were not classified as Black in the Mathematica sample had a 
Hispanic (possibly Black) mother, it is quite likely that these students would have been 
classified as Black had they or their parents been given the opportunity to report the race 
of the child on the questionnaire.   
                                                 
24 As an example of the types of problems created by this procedure, note that 8 students in the data set had 
a Black (non-Hispanic) father and were missing information on their mother￿s race/ethnicity; these students 
were classified as non-Black.  In three of these cases, there is no indication the mother lived at home.    27
Yet another concern is that the data were coded in such a way that parents who 
checked ￿Other￿ and then wrote in a response in the blank were typically classified as 
non-Black and non-Hispanic, regardless of what they wrote in.  This is problematic 
because in many cases the child￿s mother wrote ￿Black/Hispanic￿ or ￿Black/Puerto 
Rican,￿ and a few even wrote in just ￿African American￿ or ￿Black.￿  Clearly, children in 
these households would be classified as Black/African American in most surveys.   
In Table 5 we present results for the group of students for whom either parent￿s 
race/ethnicity is identified as Black/African American (non-Hispanic).  We also include 
in the sample students whose parents responded ￿Other￿ for race/ethnicity and then 
indicated that their race was Black in their write-in response.
25  These changes increase 
the sample by about 10 percent.  This is a broader definition of Black students￿ race than 
the one employed previously, although it still treats race and Hispanic origin as mutually 
exclusive unless such a response was written in, contrary to the OMB guidelines.   
Notably, the results for the broader sample of Black students are weaker than 
those in the original sample.  In the full sample, including students with missing baseline 
scores, the effect of offering a voucher on the third-year composite score is quite small 
(1.44 NPR￿s) and statistically insignificant at conventional levels (t-ratio=1.01).  To put 
this in context, note that the standard deviation of percentile ranks in the national 
population is 28.9 (because percentiles are uniform), so the estimated effect size is only 
0.05 standard deviations.  If we use only students in grades 1-4 and the larger group of 
Black students, the fourth model in Table 5 yields a coefficient of 2.67 points and a   
                                                 
25 Of the 78 students who are added in Table 5 model 3, 43 were added because their father was reported as 
Black and 35 because a written response for the mother￿s race/ethnicity indicated that her race was Black, 
usually by writing Black/Hispanic or Black combined with a specific Latin country.  Mathematica used the 
written-in responses in an inconsistent way, sometimes using them to assign race and sometimes not.    28
t-ratio of 1.78, which suggests that the previous results for grades 1-4 are fragile if a more 
conventional definition of race is used.   
Moreover, if we interact treatment status with three dummies indicating 
combinations of parents￿ race (mother Black, father Black, both parents Black), we do 
not reject that the treatment effect is the same for all three groups.  The coefficients, with 
standard errors in parentheses, for the voucher-race interactions in the last model of Table 
5 in year three, for example, are: 1.37 (1.73) for both parents Black; 0.34 (5.91) for father 
Black, mother non-Black or Hispanic; and 1.53 (2.36) for mother Black, father non-Black 
or Hispanic.  The p-value for an F-test of the null hypothesis that the three effects are 
equal is 0.98, about as far from rejecting the null of constant treatment effects as possible.   
These results cast further doubt on the extent to which one can generalize 
previous findings from the voucher experiment to the population of low-income Black 
students.  We would stress that the qualitatively different results in Table 5 stem 
primarily from two plausible changes in the sample from previous studies: students with 
missing baseline scores are included and parental race is treated symmetrically for 
assigning children￿s race.  We regard the results in Table 5 as the most relevant estimates 
of the impact of offering private school vouchers on achievement for the broadest sample 
of Black elementary school children.  This sample comes closer to meeting the OMB 
guidelines, although some Black/Hispanic children are undoubtedly excluded.  The 
finding that the results are so sensitive to these defensible changes in the sample leads us 
to conclude that the provision of vouchers in New York City probably had no more than a 
trivial effect on the average test performance of participating Black students.  
Furthermore, if parents were not asked to give a mutually exclusive response to their race  29
and ethnicity in a single question, contrary to the OMB guidelines ￿ or if data on the 
students￿ race were directly collected ￿ the effect of vouchers for Black students of any 
ethnicity would likely be even smaller.   
 
5.  Effect of Time in Private School – Instrumental Variables Estimates 
Although the ITT estimates of the effect of offering a student a voucher are of 
much interest, another question concerns the effect of attending private school on student 
achievement.  Howell and Peterson (2002) and Mayer, Peterson and Myers, et al. (2002) 
report Instrumental Variables (IV) estimates to assess the impact of attending private 
school on student achievement.
26  Specifically, they create a dummy variable that equals 
one if the student attended private school for three consecutive years, and zero otherwise.  
They then use the voucher offer dummy as an instrument for private school attendance.  
Because the voucher was randomly offered, if the variables are correctly measured this 
approach yields a consistent estimate of the population parameter.  (If there are 
heterogeneous treatment effects across students, additional assumptions are necessary to 
interpret the parameter as the causal effect on compliers; see Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 
1996.)  As Rouse (1997) and Mayer, Peterson and Myers, et al. point out, if switching to 
private school for one or two years raises (lowers) achievement, this approach will 
overstate (understate) the impact of attending private school for three years versus not at 
all.  Mayer, Peterson and Myers, et al. also present estimates where the endogenous 
regressor is a dummy indicating whether the student ever attended private school.   
Intuitively, all the IV estimates involve scaling the ITT estimate emphasized  
                                                 
26 The technique of Instrumental Variables was first used by the economist P.G. Wright in 1928; see Stock 
and Trebbi (2003).    30
previously by the difference in some quantity between those offered and not offered a 
voucher.  To see this, note that if there are no covariates the IV estimate of the effect of 
attending private school for three years, θ, has probability limit:   
(4)         plim θ = {E[Y | Z = 1] - E[Y | Z = 0]} / {E[P3 | Z = 1] -  E[P3 | Z = 0]}, 
where Y is test scores, Z is a dummy that equals one if a voucher was offered and zero if 
not, and P3 is a dummy variable that equals one if the student was enrolled in private 
school for all three years of the experiment and zero otherwise.  The numerator is the ITT 
estimate.  In a model in which attending private school for at least one year is the 
endogenous regressor, the numerator is the same but the denominator is the treatment-
control difference in the probability of attending private school at least one year.   
An alternative approach is to treat the number of years in private school as the 
relevant variable of interest.  Assuming years in private school have a linear effect on 
achievement, the equations of interest are: 
(5)    Qif  = α0 + α1Zf  + Xif￿α2 + γ
j
if  +  ￿if 
(6)    Yif  = β0 + β1Qif  + Xif￿β2 + δ
j
if  + εif, 
where Qif is the number of years the student has spent in a private school up to that point 
of the experiment, Zf is a dummy indicating whether the student was offered a voucher, 





if  are randomization strata fixed effects, and ￿if and εif are equation errors.  
Interest is in the parameter β1, which measures the marginal impact on performance of 
attending private school an additional year.  An advantage of the linear model is that the 
coefficient β1 can be compared in different years.  Furthermore, for comparison to θ, an 
estimate of the effect of attending private school for all three years is 3β1.  31
  Two-Stage Least Squares estimates of β1 using various samples are presented in 
Table 6.  Similar to our earlier findings, the results indicate that spending more time in 
private school has a positive and statistically significant effect on achievement for 
children of Black (non-Hispanic) mothers when the analysis is confined to those with 
baseline test scores, but an insignificant effect in the larger samples.  In the third follow-
up, the implied effect of attending a private school for three years is 6.4 points (t = 2.58) 
in the sample with baseline test scores, and 3.3 points (t = 1.41) in the sample that is not 
restricted to those with baseline scores.  These effects are, respectively, 31 and 65 percent 
smaller than the estimated impact of spending three years in a private school emphasized 
by Howell and Peterson (2002; Table 6-3).
27 
The third set of columns in Table 6 use the race/ethnicity of the father as well as 
the mother to delineate the samples.  That is, as in Table 5, the sample of Black (non-
Hispanic) students includes children for whom either parent is reported as Black (non-
Hispanic).  The sample of Latino students likewise includes students for whom either 
parent is reported as Puerto Rican, Dominican, or other Hispanic.  (These samples are not 
mutually exclusive, as is normally the case with race and ethnicity.)  For students with a 
Black parent, the estimated effect of attending a private school for three years is 2.2 
points (t=1.01), 76 percent smaller than Howell and Peterson￿s estimate for students with 
a Black (non-Hispanic) mother.   
One final consideration involves measurement error in private school attendance.  
For the controls, information on whether students attended private or public school was 
primarily inferred from the parents￿ report of the name of the school, and public/private 
                                                 
27 These estimates use the revised weights and original strata controls.  If we use the same model, weights 
and strata controls as Howell and Peterson (2002), we can replicate their results.   32
school attendance is missing in at least one year for 42 percent of control group 
members.
28  Administrative records were used to determine private school enrollment for 
those offered a voucher, so this variable is never missing for the treatment group.  To 
avoid dropping observations, Howell and Peterson and Mathematica imputed a value for 
public or private school enrollment if this information was missing.  We followed their 
procedures.  However, there is clearly measurement error in private school attendance for 
many students.  The imputed values are unlikely to be correct in every case.  Even for the 
treatment group, several parents indicated that their child attended a parochial school, yet 
they were classified as attending public school that year, or vice versa.   
Random measurement error would not affect the consistency of IV estimates if 
the endogenous variable were continuous.  In the case of a binary endogenous variable 
(e.g., if the variable being instrumented for is a dummy indicating  private school 
attendance for three years), however, Kane, Rouse and Staiger (1999) show that IV 
estimates are asymptotically biased, in an upwards direction under conditions that are 
likely to hold.  This results because measurement error is necessarily correlated with the 
true value of the endogenous variable in the case of a dummy variable, and therefore 
correlated with the instrument.  Because misreporting and imputation create measurement 
error in their private school enrollment variable, Howell and Peterson￿s IV estimates are 
likely to overstate any effect of switching to private school on achievement.  This is 
another reason to favor the ITT estimates.   
                                                 
28 For control group members with available third year follow-up test data and baseline test scores, 18.5 
percent are missing information on whether they attended a private or public school in at least one year.   33
6.  Conclusion  
Our reanalysis of the New York City school voucher experiment suggests that the 
positive effect of vouchers on the achievement of African American students emphasized 
by previous researchers is less robust than commonly acknowledged.  Most importantly, 
if the cohort of students who were enrolled in Kindergarten when the experiment began is 
included in the sample, the effect of vouchers is greatly attenuated.  As the results in 
Table 5 indicate, treating mother and father￿s race symmetrically further attenuates the 
effect of school vouchers for African American children.  The evidence is stronger that 
the availability of private school vouchers raised achievement on math than on reading 
exams after three years, but both effects are relatively small if the sample includes 
students with missing baseline test scores and students who have at least one Black 
parent.   
Below is a list of several issues about experimental program evaluation that we 
believe our analysis raises:   
!  Researchers are often unsure as to whether they should or should not control for 
baseline characteristics when a treatment is randomly assigned.  We would advise that 
key results be presented both ways, with and without baseline characteristics (and with 
and without varying samples).
29  In expectation, the treatment effect should not change; if 
it does, more work is needed to understand why.   
!  Controlling for baseline characteristics can be justified if their inclusion increases the 
precision of the key estimates.  As a practical matter, however, controlling for baseline 
                                                 
29 This is often done in the academic economics literature.  For example, Angrist, Bettinger, and Bloom, et 
al. (2002) present results with and without baseline controls in their analysis of a natural experiment 
involving vouchers in Colombia.  Researchers are on stronger grounds for presenting results that do not 
condition on baseline covariates when they have an actual randomized experiment.  34
characteristics tends to reduce the sample size, which could well offset the decline in 
residual variance and create a non-representative sample.  
!  Simplicity and transparency are valuable in their own right and can help prevent 
mistakes.  These benefits may be well worth the loss of some precision.  A complicated 
design increases the likelihood of error down the road ￿ for example, in the derivation of 
weights or in the delineation of strata within which the treatment is randomly assigned.  
An under appreciated virtue of presenting results without baseline covariates is that the 
results are transparent and simple, and therefore less prone to human error.   
!  Having a broader sample expands the population to which the results can be 
generalized.  One wonders why the foundations that funded the voucher experiment paid 
the additional costs to grant scholarships and administer follow-up tests to 
Kindergarteners and other students with missing baseline tests if they were not to be used 
in the analysis.
30  Because these students make up more than 40 percent of the sample 
used in previous analyses, there was also a loss in efficiency from excluding them from 
the sample.  (It is unclear whether follow-up tests were administered to students with 
missing baseline test scores in the Dayton and Washington experiments.)  In addition, 
because decisions by parents about whether to send their children to private school in a 
publicly funded voucher program are particularly likely to be made around the time of 
school entry, one could argue that the experience of the Kindergarten cohort is the most 
relevant of the five cohorts for extrapolating the results to a broader, permanent voucher 
program.   
                                                 
30 Certainly the participating students would wonder why they were inconvenienced on three weekends to 
take exams that were not used in the analysis published by the research team.    35
!  Researchers often make data available to other scholars, but limit the data to the 
sample and variables used in their previous analysis.  Mathematica deserves much credit 
for quickly making data available (for a small fee) to outside researchers who agreed to 
adhere to certain confidentiality requirements, and for providing all their data, not just the 
subset used to generate results presented in previously published reports.   
!  The definition of race can be more than an incidental detail.  Researchers should think 
carefully about the assignment of a child￿s race, especially if the child or parent is not 
asked to directly report the child￿s race.  Because race is inherently a subjective concept, 
there may  be benefits from exploring the sensitivity of the findings to alternative 
definitions of race.  Government statistics typically define race and ethnicity separately.  
Using a consistent and clear definition of race is necessary if results are to be compared 
across studies and data sets.  For example, NAEP data from NCES define race to include 
students of any ethnicity, so the Black-White gap from NAEP is not a comparable 
benchmark for statistics pertaining to students with a Black (non-Hispanic) mother from 
the voucher experiments.   
Computing separate results by race was not an original goal of the New York City 
voucher experiment.  Indeed, in the first-year follow-up report, results were not reported 
separately by race.  Only after the results indicated no impact for the full sample were the 
data disaggregated by race.  Had race been a priority of the study from the beginning, we 
suspect the survey designers would have asked directly about students￿ race and their 
Hispanic ethnicity.   
!  Although we do not think that a fully specified and empirically verified theoretical 
model is necessary to interpret experimental results (let alone achievable), a plausible and  36
testable theoretical explanation can help avoid mistakes in interpretation and policy.  For 
example, the lack of a convincing theory for why African American students would 
benefit from vouchers while Hispanic students from the same schools would not is a 
cause for concern in interpreting the New York City experiment.  In its simplest form, 
Howell and Peterson￿s model of constrained residential choice would predict that poor 
Hispanic students attending the same initial public schools as African American students 
would experience a rise in test scores from vouchers, at variance with the data.  
Combined with our finding that the effect of vouchers for African American students is 
more fragile than previous analyses of the data have suggested, we would counsel caution 
in concluding that vouchers raised achievement for African American students in New 
York City.  The safest conclusion is probably that the provision of vouchers did not lower 
the scores of African American students.     37
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forthcoming, Journal of Economic Perspectives.   Table 1: Treatment-Control Differences at Baseline by Assignment Status, Selected Variables
Mean Mean Raw T-C  Conditional on Lottery Strata:   Sample
Group treatment control Difference   t-ratio  T-C Difference          t-ratio   size
MOTHER'S YEARS OF EDUCATION
Overall 12.85 12.78 0.08 0.72 0.08 0.76 2,476
 Black- all 13.03 12.96 0.07 0.50 0.11 0.74 1,081
  Black-ch0 12.83 12.91 -0.09 -0.31 -0.10 -0.35 233
  Black-ch1 13.10 13.22 -0.12 -0.45 -0.03 -0.12 215
  Black-ch2 13.22 13.07 0.15 0.52 0.19 0.62 247
  Black-ch3 12.83 12.87 -0.03 -0.12 0.01 0.02 216
  Black-ch4 13.20 12.58 0.62 1.92 0.52 1.45 169
 Latino-all 12.48 12.40 0.08 0.53 0.09 0.58 1,186
MOTHER GRADUATED COLLEGE
Overall 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.95 0.01 0.90 2,476
 Black- all 0.12 0.09 0.03 1.28 0.04 1.71 1,081
  Black-ch0 0.13 0.05 0.07 1.82 0.06 1.53 233
  Black-ch1 0.07 0.12 -0.05 -1.12 -0.01 -0.28 215
  Black-ch2 0.17 0.13 0.03 0.57 0.04 0.67 247
  Black-ch3 0.07 0.08 -0.01 -0.29 0.00 -0.11 216
  Black-ch4 0.20 0.04 0.16 2.93 0.13 2.25 169
 Latino-all 0.06 0.07 0.00 -0.18 0.00 -0.11 1,186
ANNUAL INCOME
Overall $10,247 $9,984 $263 0.69 $248 0.66 2,433
 Black- all 10,582 10,310 272 0.45 153 0.25 1,068
  Black-ch0 11,847 10,326 1,521 1.21 1,193 0.87 228
  Black-ch1 8,688 10,396 -1,709 -1.51 -1,395 -1.10 213
  Black-ch2 10,688 10,075 613 0.61 450 0.41 246
  Black-ch3 9,747 10,778 -1,031 -0.99 -1,053 -0.95 211
  Black-ch4 12,466 9,915 2,551 2.19 2,589 1.84 169
 Latino-all 9,871 9,459 412 0.78 275 0.54 1,161
BASELINE TEST SCORES
COMPOSITE MATH AND READING SCORE (AVERAGE NPR)
Overall 20.02 20.83 -0.82 -0.79 -0.65 -0.61 1,851
 Black- all 20.05 20.41 -0.36 -0.25 -0.34 -0.23 806
  Black-ch0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
  Black-ch1 17.31 21.70 -4.39 -1.53 -4.46 -1.38 203
  Black-ch2 23.35 22.45 0.90 0.34 -0.30 -0.10 230
  Black-ch3 16.17 18.03 -1.86 -0.75 -1.91 -0.74 214
  Black-ch4 24.81 18.40 6.41 2.11 5.73 1.78 159
 Latino-all 18.09 19.97 -1.87 -1.31 -1.78 -1.15 876
READING (NPR)
Overall 22.90 24.55 -1.65 -1.35 -1.45 -1.16 1,851
 Black- all 24.33 25.37 -1.04 -0.58 -0.90 -0.48 806
  Black-ch0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
  Black-ch1 24.46 31.09 -6.63 -1.64 -7.45 -1.57 203
  Black-ch2 26.40 25.94 0.46 0.13 0.72 0.19 230
  Black-ch3 19.75 21.69 -1.94 -0.71 -2.80 -1.00 214
  Black-ch4 27.75 20.75 7.00 2.12 7.59 2.09 159
 Latino-all 19.82 23.26 -3.44 -1.98 -3.18 -1.70 876MATH (NPR)
Overall 17.13 17.11 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.14 1,851
 Black- all 15.76 15.45 0.32 0.22 0.22 0.15 806
  Black-ch0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
  Black-ch1 10.16 12.31 -2.15 -0.95 -1.47 -0.62 203
  Black-ch2 20.29 18.96 1.33 0.51 -1.31 -0.47 230
  Black-ch3 12.59 14.37 -1.78 -0.67 -1.02 -0.37 214
  Black-ch4 21.88 16.06 5.81 1.60 3.87 1.10 159
 Latino-all 16.37 16.67 -0.30 -0.20 -0.39 -0.25 876
MOTHER EMPLOYED FULL TIME
Overall 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.10 2,479
 Black- all 0.28 0.26 0.02 0.66 0.01 0.33 1,083
  Black-ch0 0.36 0.27 0.09 1.26 0.04 0.53 233
  Black-ch1 0.19 0.29 -0.11 -1.61 -0.08 -1.12 216
  Black-ch2 0.27 0.20 0.06 1.09 0.07 1.19 248
  Black-ch3 0.25 0.31 -0.06 -0.94 -0.10 -1.28 216
  Black-ch4 0.36 0.19 0.17 2.40 0.17 2.02 169
 Latino-all 0.19 0.19 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 1,187
STUDENT SEX (MALE)
Overall 0.50 0.48 0.01 0.67 0.01 0.64 2,617
 Black- all 0.47 0.53 -0.06 -1.73 -0.06 -1.72 1,134
  Black-ch0 0.42 0.60 -0.18 -2.56 -0.22 -3.27 241
  Black-ch1 0.50 0.59 -0.09 -1.17 -0.14 -1.60 225
  Black-ch2 0.51 0.54 -0.03 -0.41 -0.08 -1.22 256
  Black-ch3 0.46 0.43 0.02 0.35 0.00 -0.06 232
  Black-ch4 0.48 0.46 0.02 0.25 0.05 0.51 180
 Latino-all 0.49 0.44 0.05 1.50 0.04 1.37 1,253
MOTHER'S PLACE OF BIRTH USA
Overall 0.53 0.55 -0.03 -0.98 -0.03 -0.98 2,593
 Black- all 0.75 0.82 -0.06 -1.95 -0.08 -2.47 1,132
  Black-ch0 0.74 0.77 -0.03 -0.47 0.00 -0.01 240
  Black-ch1 0.76 0.86 -0.11 -1.66 -0.15 -2.31 225
  Black-ch2 0.77 0.78 -0.01 -0.17 -0.05 -0.86 261
  Black-ch3 0.82 0.82 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 -0.86 227
  Black-ch4 0.64 0.87 -0.23 -3.49 -0.22 -3.04 178
 Latino-all 0.32 0.36 -0.04 -1.17 -0.05 -1.29 1,245
FOOD STAMP RECIPIENT
Overall 0.66 0.68 -0.03 -1.09 -0.02 -0.98 2,474
 Black- all 0.63 0.69 -0.06 -1.59 -0.04 -1.10 1,074
  Black-ch0 0.61 0.70 -0.08 -1.22 -0.08 -1.08 227
  Black-ch1 0.71 0.68 0.03 0.38 0.07 0.80 216
  Black-ch2 0.59 0.69 -0.10 -1.52 -0.13 -1.82 248
  Black-ch3 0.69 0.67 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.03 217
  Black-ch4 0.54 0.73 -0.18 -2.31 -0.20 -2.28 165
 Latino-all 0.67 0.70 -0.02 -0.60 -0.02 -0.43 1,190
AFDC RECIPIENT
Overall 0.57 0.60 -0.03 -1.13 -0.03 -0.95 2,375
 Black- all 0.58 0.65 -0.06 -1.64 -0.05 -1.32 1,030
  Black-ch0 0.57 0.63 -0.06 -0.83 -0.07 -0.89 218
  Black-ch1 0.64 0.63 0.01 0.16 0.03 0.33 204
  Black-ch2 0.51 0.66 -0.15 -2.22 -0.18 -2.42 241
  Black-ch3 0.64 0.60 0.05 0.64 0.03 0.34 206
  Black-ch4 0.53 0.73 -0.20 -2.59 -0.24 -2.77 160
 Latino-all 0.54 0.59 -0.05 -1.21 -0.04 -1.08 1,143MEDICAID RECIPIENT
Overall 0.62 0.68 -0.06 -2.37 -0.06 -2.15 2,299
 Black- all 0.59 0.68 -0.09 -2.25 -0.07 -1.84 1,003
  Black-ch0 0.61 0.69 -0.08 -1.10 -0.07 -0.91 217
  Black-ch1 0.57 0.60 -0.03 -0.41 -0.01 -0.15 195
  Black-ch2 0.58 0.71 -0.13 -1.93 -0.15 -1.97 239
  Black-ch3 0.67 0.69 -0.02 -0.22 -0.02 -0.31 203
  Black-ch4 0.52 0.73 -0.22 -2.70 -0.22 -2.39 148
 Latino-all 0.63 0.70 -0.07 -1.83 -0.06 -1.55 1,098
EVER ATTENDED GIFTED STUDENT CLASSES
Overall 0.12 0.12 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.07 2,547
 Black- all 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.65 0.01 0.51 1,115
  Black-ch0 0.08 0.09 -0.02 -0.40 0.00 -0.10 239
  Black-ch1 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.21 -0.01 -0.19 222
  Black-ch2 0.21 0.17 0.04 0.63 0.00 0.05 254
  Black-ch3 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.59 0.06 1.37 227
  Black-ch4 0.21 0.19 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.17 173
 Latino-all 0.09 0.09 -0.01 -0.32 -0.01 -0.28 1,208
EVER RECEIVED SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES
Overall 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.73 0.01 0.74 2,574
 Black- all 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.66 0.02 0.78 1,111
  Black-ch0 0.08 0.09 -0.02 -0.38 -0.02 -0.33 238
  Black-ch1 0.07 0.11 -0.03 -0.60 -0.03 -0.53 222
  Black-ch2 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.70 -0.01 -0.14 252
  Black-ch3 0.16 0.06 0.09 2.13 0.08 1.92 226
  Black-ch4 0.14 0.15 -0.01 -0.25 0.03 0.44 173
 Latino-all 0.11 0.12 -0.01 -0.49 -0.01 -0.51 1,239
ADDENDUM:  THIRD YEAR FOLLOW-UP TEST RESULTS
COMPOSITE MATH AND READING SCORE (AVERAGE NPR)
Overall 26.94 27.09 -0.15 -0.12 -0.25 -0.21 1,801
 Black- all 25.64 23.78 1.86 1.11 2.78 1.64 733
  Black-ch0 22.19 27.04 -4.85 -1.26 -5.80 -1.50 156
  Black-ch1 26.69 23.73 2.96 0.73 1.38 0.30 139
  Black-ch2 23.02 21.47 1.55 0.52 2.59 0.77 177
  Black-ch3 28.26 26.40 1.86 0.53 2.11 0.55 139
  Black-ch4 28.54 20.31 8.23 2.21 10.28 2.55 122
 Latino-all 26.37 28.12 -1.75 -1.08 -1.52 -0.90 932
EVER ATTENDED PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THREE YEARS
Overall 0.77 0.11 0.66 35.73 0.66 35.98 2,117
 Black- all 0.81 0.10 0.71 28.15 0.70 27.23 903
  Black-ch0 0.81 0.18 0.63 11.23 0.57 9.63 192
  Black-ch1 0.82 0.04 0.78 16.01 0.78 15.21 176
  Black-ch2 0.82 0.07 0.75 17.69 0.75 16.01 206
  Black-ch3 0.76 0.11 0.65 12.25 0.65 12.63 182
  Black-ch4 0.82 0.06 0.76 15.77 0.77 15.44 146
 Latino-all 0.77 0.11 0.66 25.23 0.66 25.53 1,021
Notes: ch-0 refers to Kindergartners at baseline, ch-1 to first graders at baseline, and so on.
Observations with missing values for a particular variable are dropped from the sample in the 
relevant row.  Bootstrap standard errors used to compute the t-ratios account for dependent 
observations within families.  Lottery strata are the 30 groups students were placed in at the
time of random assignment.  Observations are weighted using revised baseline weights.
A bold font indicates that the absolute t-ratio for the within-strata treatment-control difference 
exceeds 1.96.Table 2: Efficiency Comparison of Two Methods of Random Assignment
Estimated Treatment Effect and Standard Error By Method of Random Assignment
A. All Students
    Sample-Size-
Year Model Propensity Score Match Subsample    Stratified Blocks Subsample   Relative     Adjusted Relative
Coeff. Std. Error Nobs. Coeff. Std. Error Nobs.   Std. Error     Std. Error
Year 1 Control for baseline -0.12 1.51 721 2.50 1.52 734 1.007 1.016
Omit baseline 0.19 1.63 1048 -0.87 1.70 1032 1.043 1.035
Year 2 Control for baseline 0.89 1.52 603 0.30 1.84 596 1.207 1.200
Omit baseline 0.76 1.61 908 -1.05 1.81 846 1.123 1.084
Year 3 Control for baseline 1.04 1.58 613 0.78 1.79 637 1.133 1.155
Omit baseline -0.18 1.57 900 -0.31 1.79 901 1.140 1.141
B. African American Students
Year 1 Control for baseline -0.10 1.79 302 9.29 1.80 321 1.006 1.037
Omit baseline 2.42 2.00 436 4.40 2.23 447 1.115 1.129
Year 2 Control for baseline 2.81 2.10 244 3.80 2.87 253 1.369 1.394
Omit baseline 4.33 2.25 360 0.63 2.53 362 1.129 1.132
Year 3 Control for baseline 3.78 2.56 247 6.45 2.17 272 0.848 0.890
Omit baseline 2.23 2.47 347 3.32 2.36 386 0.955 1.008
Notes: Treatment effect coefficient is from a regression of test scores on a dummy indicating assignment to receive a voucher (1=yes), 
original 30 lottery randomization strata dummies, and in some models baseline test scores.  Bootstrap standard errors account for 
within-family correlation in residuals.  Year 1, 2, or 3 refers to follow-up year.  Revised follow-up weights are used to weight observations.Table 3a: Estimated treatment effects, with and without controlling for baseline scores
                 Controls for 30 randomization strata as defined by Mayer, Peterson and Myers, et al. (2000) and uses their follow-up weights
Test Group SubSample with Baseline Scores; SubSample with Baseline Scores;   Full Sample;
Controls For Baseline Scores  Omits Baseline Scores   Omits Baseline Scores
First Follow-up Test:    NOBS Coefficient     S.E.    t-ratio    NOBS Coefficient     S.E.  t-ratio    NOBS Coefficient     S.E.     t-ratio
Composite Overall 1,455 1.20 0.97 1.24 1,455 0.23 1.30 0.18 2,080 -0.40 1.06 -0.38
Black 623 4.43 1.27 3.48 623 3.87 1.73 2.24 883 2.64 1.42 1.86
Latino 709 -0.66 1.38 -0.48 709 -2.59 1.77 -1.46 1,021 -2.05 1.56 -1.31
Reading Overall 1,455 1.01 1.05 0.96 1,455 -0.18 1.38 -0.13 2,080 -1.17 1.18 -0.99
Black 623 3.47 1.57 2.21 623 2.74 1.98 1.38 883 1.46 1.72 0.85
Latino 709 -0.70 1.45 -0.48 709 -3.02 1.88 -1.60 1,021 -2.60 1.72 -1.51
Math Overall 1,455 1.39 1.17 1.19 1,455 0.65 1.45 0.45 2,080 0.37 1.16 0.31
Black 623 5.39 1.52 3.56 623 5.01 1.92 2.60 883 3.82 1.54 2.48
Latino 709 -0.63 1.70 -0.37 709 -2.17 2.00 -1.08 1,021 -1.50 1.67 -0.90
Second Follow-up Test:
Composite Overall 1,199 0.46 1.13 0.41 1,199 0.14 1.44 0.10 1,754 0.05 1.22 0.04
Black 497 3.27 1.68 1.95 497 3.51 1.94 1.81 722 2.58 1.70 1.52
Latino 612 -0.60 1.50 -0.40 612 -2.34 1.97 -1.19 902 -1.83 1.62 -1.13
Reading Overall 1,199 1.35 1.11 1.22 1,199 0.83 1.45 0.57 1,754 0.62 1.30 0.48
Black 497 3.44 1.74 1.97 497 3.50 2.06 1.70 722 2.52 1.90 1.32
Latino 612 0.17 1.55 0.11 612 -1.75 2.05 -0.85 902 -1.17 1.73 -0.68
Math Overall 1,199 -0.43 1.51 -0.28 1,199 -0.55 1.73 -0.32 1,754 -0.52 1.39 -0.38
Black 497 3.10 2.18 1.42 497 3.53 2.36 1.49 722 2.64 1.97 1.35
Latino 612 -1.37 1.92 -0.72 612 -2.93 2.29 -1.28 902 -2.48 1.82 -1.36
Third Follow-up Test
Composite Overall 1,250 0.93 1.13 0.82 1,250 0.24 1.40 0.17 1,801 -0.31 1.18 -0.26
Black 519 5.50 1.61 3.42 519 5.30 1.91 2.77 733 2.87 1.69 1.71
Latino 637 -0.95 1.57 -0.60 637 -1.86 2.00 -0.93 932 -1.35 1.66 -0.81
Reading Overall 1,250 0.27 1.25 0.21 1,250 -0.56 1.52 -0.37 1,801 -0.95 1.25 -0.77
Black 519 3.97 1.87 2.13 519 3.56 2.18 1.63 733 1.53 1.83 0.84
Latino 637 -1.85 1.73 -1.07 637 -2.90 2.15 -1.35 932 -1.81 1.78 -1.01
Math Overall 1,250 1.59 1.28 1.24 1,250 1.05 1.52 0.69 1,801 0.33 1.32 0.25
Black 519 7.03 1.82 3.86 519 7.04 2.06 3.41 733 4.22 1.85 2.28
Latino 637 -0.05 1.82 -0.03 637 -0.82 2.19 -0.38 932 -0.89 1.83 -0.48
Notes: Dependent variable is test score NPR.  Reported coefficient is coefficient on voucher offer dummy.  All regressions control for 30 revised randomization strata.   
Bootstrap standard errors are robust to correlation in residuals among students in the same family.  Bold font indicates that the absolute t-ratio exceeds 1.96.Table 3b: Estimated treatment effects, with and without controlling for baseline scores
                   Controls for original 30 strata used to assign students to random assignment blocks and uses revised weights
Test Group SubSample with Baseline Scores; SubSample with Baseline Scores;   Full Sample;
Controls For Baseline Scores  Omits Baseline Scores   Omits Baseline Scores
First Follow-up Test:    NOBS Coefficient     S.E.     t-ratio    NOBS Coefficient     S.E.  t-ratio    NOBS Coefficient     S.E.     t-ratio
Composite Overall 1,455 1.29 1.05 1.22 1,455 0.15 1.45 0.11 2,080 -0.34 1.18 -0.29
Black 623 4.70 1.30 3.63 623 4.35 1.76 2.47 883 3.42 1.47 2.33
Latino 709 -0.14 1.36 -0.11 709 -1.31 1.69 -0.78 1,021 -1.06 1.49 -0.71
Reading Overall 1,455 1.20 1.08 1.11 1,455 0.02 1.46 0.01 2,080 -0.84 1.25 -0.67
Black 623 3.76 1.61 2.34 623 3.35 2.05 1.64 883 2.30 1.82 1.26
Latino 709 -0.14 1.45 -0.10 709 -1.64 1.83 -0.90 1,021 -1.50 1.65 -0.91
Math Overall 1,455 1.37 1.32 1.03 1,455 0.29 1.69 0.17 2,080 0.17 1.34 0.12
Black 623 5.65 1.54 3.66 623 5.35 1.94 2.75 883 4.54 1.55 2.94
Latino 709 -0.15 1.70 -0.09 709 -0.99 1.94 -0.51 1,021 -0.62 1.60 -0.39
Second Follow-up Test:
Composite Overall 1,199 0.64 1.18 0.54 1,199 0.38 1.43 0.26 1,754 -0.14 1.22 -0.11
Black 497 3.33 1.79 1.86 497 3.49 1.96 1.78 722 2.47 1.69 1.46
Latino 612 -0.52 1.58 -0.33 612 -1.64 1.97 -0.83 902 -2.03 1.61 -1.25
Reading Overall 1,199 1.49 1.15 1.29 1,199 1.11 1.47 0.76 1,754 0.41 1.30 0.32
Black 497 3.72 1.77 2.10 497 3.77 2.02 1.86 722 2.35 1.82 1.29
Latino 612 0.38 1.66 0.23 612 -0.94 2.09 -0.45 902 -1.39 1.76 -0.79
Math Overall 1,199 -0.20 1.57 -0.13 1,199 -0.36 1.73 -0.21 1,754 -0.69 1.40 -0.50
Black 497 2.94 2.39 1.23 497 3.21 2.49 1.29 722 2.59 2.05 1.27
Latino 612 -1.42 1.98 -0.72 612 -2.34 2.27 -1.03 902 -2.66 1.79 -1.48
Third Follow-up Test
Composite Overall 1,250 0.95 1.16 0.81 1,250 0.52 1.41 0.37 1,801 -0.25 1.20 -0.21
Black 519 5.03 1.67 3.02 519 5.00 1.95 2.57 733 2.78 1.69 1.64
Latino 637 -1.00 1.61 -0.62 637 -1.63 1.98 -0.82 932 -1.52 1.68 -0.90
Reading Overall 1,250 0.40 1.30 0.31 1,250 -0.16 1.55 -0.11 1,801 -0.73 1.26 -0.58
Black 519 3.65 1.95 1.88 519 3.37 2.24 1.50 733 1.55 1.86 0.84
Latino 637 -1.71 1.80 -0.95 637 -2.50 2.15 -1.16 932 -1.81 1.81 -1.00
Math Overall 1,250 1.49 1.33 1.12 1,250 1.21 1.54 0.78 1,801 0.23 1.35 0.17
Black 519 6.42 1.87 3.42 519 6.62 2.11 3.13 733 4.00 1.87 2.14
Latino 637 -0.29 1.84 -0.16 637 -0.77 2.18 -0.38 932 -1.22 1.83 -0.67
Notes: Dependent variable is test score NPR.  Reported coefficient is coefficient on voucher offer dummy.  All regressions control for original 30 randomization strata.   
Bootstrap standard errors are robust to correlation in residuals among students in the same family.  Bold font indicates that the absolute t-ratio exceeds 1.96.
 Table 4: Estimated treatment effects, with varying controls for baseline characteristics 
Test Group SubSample with Baseline Scores Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
Controls for baseline scores, cohort &  Controls for cohort & other covariates   Controls for cohort, baseline scores Controls for cohort, baseline 
other covariates (omits baseline test scores) & interaction for missing scores scores, interaction for missing 
scores & other covariates
First Follow-up Test:    NOBS Coefficient     S.E.     t-ratio    NOBS Coefficient     S.E.     t-ratio Coefficient     S.E.     t-ratio Coefficient     S.E.     t-ratio
Composite Overall 1,455 1.72 0.99 1.75 2,080 0.15 1.06 0.15 0.68 0.95 0.71 0.88 0.90 0.97
Black 623 4.12 1.35 3.06 883 3.28 1.43 2.30 3.69 1.25 2.96 3.47 1.26 2.76
Latino 709 0.05 1.34 0.04 1,021 -1.21 1.36 -0.89 0.17 1.20 0.14 -0.02 1.18 -0.02
Reading Overall 1,455 1.25 1.06 1.18 2,080 -0.60 1.15 -0.53 0.16 1.05 0.15 0.17 1.01 0.17
Black 623 2.67 1.66 1.61 883 1.75 1.74 1.01 2.49 1.61 1.55 2.04 1.58 1.29
Latino 709 -0.10 1.39 -0.07 1,021 -1.47 1.58 -0.93 0.06 1.37 0.04 -0.14 1.37 -0.10
Math Overall 1,455 2.20 1.25 1.76 2,080 0.91 1.20 0.76 1.20 1.10 1.09 1.58 1.06 1.49
Black 623 5.58 1.57 3.55 883 4.80 1.51 3.17 4.89 1.33 3.66 4.90 1.37 3.59
Latino 709 0.20 1.74 0.12 1,021 -0.96 1.48 -0.65 0.28 1.35 0.20 0.09 1.35 0.07
Second Follow-up Test:
Composite Overall 1,199 0.53 1.14 0.46 1,754 -0.70 1.16 -0.60 0.07 1.05 0.07 -0.41 1.00 -0.41
Black 497 3.42 1.69 2.02 722 2.39 1.68 1.42 2.42 1.59 1.52 2.19 1.50 1.46
Latino 612 -1.31 1.57 -0.83 902 -2.83 1.49 -1.90 -1.35 1.33 -1.02 -1.86 1.29 -1.44
Reading Overall 1,199 1.57 1.16 1.35 1,754 0.07 1.24 0.06 0.70 1.11 0.63 0.40 1.08 0.37
Black 497 3.94 1.88 2.09 722 2.32 1.84 1.26 2.54 1.65 1.54 2.23 1.68 1.32
Latino 612 -0.07 1.72 -0.04 902 -1.83 1.70 -1.08 -0.57 1.49 -0.38 -0.77 1.48 -0.52
Math Overall 1,199 -0.51 1.50 -0.34 1,754 -1.47 1.34 -1.09 -0.56 1.27 -0.44 -1.21 1.22 -1.00
Black 497 2.90 2.10 1.38 722 2.45 1.97 1.25 2.30 1.99 1.15 2.15 1.81 1.19
Latino 612 -2.56 1.99 -1.29 902 -3.82 1.64 -2.33 -2.13 1.54 -1.38 -2.94 1.49 -1.98
Third Follow-up Test
Composite Overall 1,250 1.25 1.10 1.13 1,801 -0.32 1.16 -0.28 0.15 1.04 0.15 -0.02 1.01 -0.02
Black 519 4.28 1.64 2.61 733 2.08 1.69 1.24 2.76 1.55 1.78 2.13 1.51 1.41
Latino 637 -0.88 1.56 -0.56 932 -1.50 1.61 -0.94 -0.79 1.41 -0.56 -0.83 1.41 -0.59
Reading Overall 1,250 0.62 1.25 0.50 1,801 -0.83 1.23 -0.67 -0.21 1.10 -0.19 -0.46 1.09 -0.42
Black 519 3.02 1.93 1.57 733 0.78 1.84 0.42 1.72 1.70 1.01 1.02 1.66 0.61
Latino 637 -1.76 1.76 -1.00 932 -1.78 1.78 -1.00 -0.90 1.55 -0.58 -1.06 1.58 -0.67
Math Overall 1,250 1.88 1.28 1.47 1,801 0.18 1.30 0.14 0.52 1.22 0.43 0.43 1.19 0.36
Black 519 5.54 1.88 2.94 733 3.39 1.89 1.79 3.79 1.75 2.16 3.24 1.74 1.86
Latino 637 0.01 1.81 0.01 932 -1.23 1.76 -0.70 -0.68 1.60 -0.43 -0.60 1.59 -0.38
Notes: Dependent variable is test score NPR.  Reported coefficient is coefficient on voucher offer dummy.  All regressions control for original 30 randomization strata and cohort (initial grade)
dummies.  The first set of columns also control for baseline test scores.  The last two sets of columns control for baseline test scores and a dummy indicating whether baseline scores  
are missing and an interaction between that dummy and baseline test scores. When indicated, "other covariates" included are gender, mother's education, mother's  full-time or part-time 
employment status, special education, gifted or talented class, welfare, log family income, student's age, mother's place of birth, English spoken at home, mother in current residence
less than one year, mother's religion Catholic, and dummies indicating whether the covariates are missing.      
Bootstrap standard errors account for dependent observations among students in the same family. Bold font indicates absolute t-ratio in excess of 1.96.Table 5: Estimated treatment effects for all Black students
Sample includes students whose mother or father is Black/African American 
 SubSample w/ Baseline Test      Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
   Controls for baseline scores       No controls except  Controls for covariates Controls for covariates, baseline
   & covariates      randomization strata except baseline scores scores & interaction for missing scores
Test/Year N   Coefficient   S.E.   t-ratio N   Coefficient    S.E.  t-ratio     Coefficient     S.E.     t-ratio Coefficient     S.E.    t-ratio
Year One
Composite 687 3.52 1.30 2.71 974 2.35 1.53 1.54 2.24 1.46 1.53 2.63 1.21 2.17
Reading 687 2.27 1.53 1.48 974 1.36 1.82 0.75 0.83 1.72 0.48 1.28 1.49 0.86
Math 687 4.77 1.62 2.94 974 3.34 1.63 2.05 3.64 1.59 2.29 3.98 1.38 2.89
Year Two
Composite 548 2.04 1.65 1.23 793 1.36 1.63 0.83 0.96 1.63 0.59 1.10 1.43 0.77
Reading 548 2.91 1.77 1.15 793 1.57 1.81 0.87 1.20 1.80 0.67 1.39 1.61 0.86
Math 548 1.16 2.04 0.57 793 1.15 1.93 0.59 0.72 1.89 0.38 0.81 1.70 0.48
Year Three
Composite 573 4.00 1.60 2.50 811 2.01 1.67 1.20 1.14 1.64 0.69 1.44 1.43 1.01
Reading 573 2.98 1.87 1.59 811 0.99 1.84 0.54 0.01 1.77 0.00 0.45 1.59 0.28
Math 573 5.02 1.87 2.68 811 3.04 1.85 1.64 2.27 1.86 1.22 2.43 1.66 1.46
Notes: Dependent variable is test score NPR.  Reported coefficient is coefficient on voucher offer dummy.  Regressions in Column 1, 3, and 4 control for 30     
randomization strata,cohort dummies, gender, mother's education, mother's  full-time or part-time employment status, special education, gifted or talented 
class, welfare, log family income, student's age, mother's place of birth, English spoken at home, mother in current residence less than one year, and mother's 
religion.  The first set of columns also control for baseline test scores.  The last set of columns also control for a dummy indicating baseline scores missing 
and an interaction between that dummy and baseline test scores. 
Bootstrap standard errors account for dependent observations among students in the same family. Bold font indicates absolute t-ratio in excess of 1.96.Table 6: Two-Stage Least Squares estimates of effect of years in private school, with varying controls for baseline covariates
Test Group SubSample with Baseline Scores Full Sample; Mother's Race/Ethnicity Full Sample; Either Parent's Race/Ethnicity
Controls for baseline scores & covariates Controls for covariates, baseline test Controls for covariates, baseline test
scores & interaction for missing scores scores & interaction for missing scores
First Follow-up Test:    NOBS Coefficient     S.E.     t-ratio    NOBS Coefficient     S.E.     t-ratio NOBS Coefficient     S.E.     t-ratio
Composite Overall 1,449 2.36 1.35 1.74 2,080 1.23 1.32 0.93 2,080 1.23 1.32 0.93
Black 622 5.39 1.79 3.01 883 4.70 1.73 2.71 974 3.57 1.65 2.17
Latino 704 0.05 1.87 0.03 1,021 -0.04 1.72 -0.02 1,145 0.26 1.72 0.15
 
Reading Overall 1,449 1.73 1.43 1.21 2,080 0.24 1.46 0.17 2,080 0.24 1.46 0.17
Black 622 3.49 2.15 1.62 883 2.77 2.15 1.29 974 1.75 2.00 0.87
Latino 704 -0.11 1.96 -0.06 1,021 -0.21 2.00 -0.11 1,145 -0.38 1.98 -0.19
 
Math Overall 1,449 2.99 1.74 1.72 2,080 2.22 1.55 1.43 2,080 2.22 1.55 1.43
Black 622 7.29 2.11 3.46 883 6.62 1.89 3.51 974 5.40 1.90 2.84
Latino 704 0.22 2.43 0.09 1,021 0.14 1.95 0.07 1,145 0.90 1.93 0.47
Second Follow-up Test:
Composite Overall 1,199 0.35 0.76 0.46 1,754 -0.28 0.69 -0.41 1,754 -0.28 0.69 -0.41
Black 497 2.13 1.05 2.03 722 1.43 0.99 1.44 793 0.72 0.93 0.77
Latino 612 -0.91 1.08 -0.84 902 -1.29 0.89 -1.46 1,006 -1.37 0.89 -1.54
 
Reading Overall 1,199 1.04 0.77 1.35 1,754 0.27 0.75 0.36 1,754 0.27 0.74 0.37
Black 497 2.45 1.17 2.10 722 1.45 1.12 1.30 793 0.91 1.06 0.86
Latino 612 -0.05 1.18 -0.04 902 -0.54 1.01 -0.53 1,006 -1.12 1.01 -1.11
 
Math Overall 1,199 -0.34 0.99 -0.34 1,754 -0.83 0.83 -1.00 1,754 -0.83 0.83 -1.00
Black 497 1.80 1.29 1.39 722 1.41 1.18 1.20 793 0.53 1.11 0.48
Latino 612 -1.76 1.36 -1.30 902 -2.05 1.03 -1.99 1,006 -1.62 1.04 -1.57
Third Follow-up Test
Composite Overall 1,250 0.62 0.55 1.13 1,801 -0.01 0.53 -0.02 1,801 -0.01 0.53 -0.02
Black 519 2.12 0.82 2.58 733 1.11 0.79 1.41 811 0.74 0.73 1.01
Latino 637 -0.44 0.78 -0.56 932 -0.43 0.72 -0.59 1,039 -0.46 0.70 -0.66
Reading Overall 1,250 0.31 0.62 0.50 1,801 -0.24 0.57 -0.42 1,801 -0.24 0.57 -0.42
Black 519 1.50 0.95 1.57 733 0.53 0.86 0.62 811 0.23 0.82 0.28
Latino 637 -0.89 0.88 -1.00 932 -0.54 0.81 -0.67 1,039 -0.51 0.78 -0.65
Math Overall 1,250 0.93 0.64 1.46 1,801 0.23 0.62 0.36 1,801 0.23 0.62 0.36
Black 519 2.74 0.95 2.89 733 1.69 0.92 1.85 811 1.25 0.86 1.46
Latino 637 0.01 0.91 0.01 932 -0.31 0.82 -0.38 1,039 -0.41 0.78 -0.53
Notes: Dependent variable is test score NPR.  Reported coefficient is coefficient on years in private school.  All regressions control for 30 randomization strata,    
cohort dummies, gender, mother's education, mother's  full-time or part-time employment status, special education, gifted or talented class, welfare, log family 
income, student's age, mother's place of birth, English spoken at home, mother in current residence less than one year, mother's religion, and dummies indicating 
whether the covariates are missing.  The first set of columns also control for baseline test scores.  The last two sets of columns also control for a dummy indicating 
whether baseline scores are missing and an interaction between that dummy and baseline test scores. 
Bootstrap standard errors account for dependent observations among students in the same family. Bold font indicates absolute t-ratio in excess of 1.96.